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ORIGINAL

BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

COMMISSIONERS BOB STUMP, CHAIRMAN **GARY PIERCE BOB BURNS** SUSAN BITTER SMITH

BRENDA BURNS

Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED JUL 0 9 2014

DOCKETED BY

DOCKET NO: WS-04235A-13-0331

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF UTILITY SOURCE, LLC, AN ARIZONA CORPORATION, FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR VALUE OF ITS UTILITY PLANTS AND PROPERTY AND FOR INCREASES IN ITS WATER AND WASTEWATER RATES AND CHARGES FOR UTILITY SERVICE BASED THEREON.

RESPONSE TO RUCO'S APPLICATION

TO INTERVENE

Utility Source, L.L.C. ("Company" or "Utility Source"), hereby files a response to the application to intervene by Residential Utility Consumer Office ("RUCO"). Utility Source moves the Court to deny RUCO's application because it is untimely and it is prejudicial.

I. RUCO'S APPLICATION IS UNTIMELY.

The procedural order dated March 17, 2014 expressly stated that all motions to intervene were due on or before June 6, 2014. See id. at p. 4. Here, RUCO did not file its application to intervene until July 7, 2014, a month after the intervention deadline had passed. RUCO is a sophisticated state agency well aware of Commission practices and procedures. As such, it should be required to follow the Commission's and this Court's rules. Accordingly, RUCO's application to intervene should be denied.

II. FACTORS CONSIDERED BY COURTS FAVOR DENYING INTERVENTION.

Notwithstanding the fact that RUCO is seeking intervention a month after the Court set deadline passed, the analysis applied by civil courts also leads to the conclusion that RUCO's application should be denied. As this Court knows, the administrative courts often refer to the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure (ARCP) for guidance. ARCP permit intervention in an action only "[u]pon timely application." *See id.*, at Rule 24. Timeliness depends upon several factors, including: (1) the stage of the lawsuit when intervention is sought; (2) whether the applicant could have sought intervention earlier; and most importantly, (3) whether intervention will be prejudicial to a party. *See State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Paynter*, 118 Ariz. 470, 471, 577 P.2d 1089, 1090 (App.1978); *Winner Enters., Ltd. v. Superior Court*, 159 Ariz. 106, 109, 765 P.2d 116, 119 (App.1988). RUCO's application fails all three prongs of this test.

A. Late Stage of the Case.

This case is in its final stages. Staff's testimony is due in one week. The Company's rebuttal testimony is due twelve business days later. The hearing is set to begin in thirty business days. It is too late to add new parties.

Ironically, in its Application, RUCO pointed out that it made this exact argument to this Court just a few months ago. In the Chaparral City case (W-02113A-12-0118),

RUCO argued:

RUCO would object to granting of intervention. The filing deadline, as you know, was November 1st. This is a sophisticated intervenor. It knows the policies hear. Nothing personal here, but we are way past the deadline.

See Application, Ex. B, Transcript at p. 11, lines 9-13. RUCO's argument was sound then and it is sound now. Consistent with its own position, RUCO should not be granted intervention in this case at this late stage.

Now, arguing the exact opposite of what it asserted just a few months ago, RUCO seems to imply that intervention should be freely given because a trade organization was granted limited party status in the Chaparral City case. In that case, the intervening trade association requested limited intervention to address two policy issues; it neither sought to introduce witnesses nor change the procedural schedule. *See* RUCO's Application, Ex. A; and Ex. B at Transcript p. 10 lines 10-16. In contrast, here RUCO seeks unlimited party status, wants to offer witnesses, and asks to change the procedural order. The Chaparral City case did not set the precedent for what RUCO now seeks; rather, it demonstrates the impropriety of RUCO's Application and why it should be denied.

B. RUCO Could Have Intervened Earlier.

Here, the Company filed its rate application in September 2013. Long ago the deadline for intervention was set as June 6, 2014. RUCO had more than eight months to intervene, but if failed to do so. Certainly, RUCO does not rely on members of the general public to inform its staff of important matters before the Commission. As a state agency with a single primary purpose of protecting residents' interests in rate cases, it

monitors the Commission rate case filings on a continual basis. Clearly, RUCO knew or should have known, about the Company's rate case in September 2013 or soon thereafter. No reasonable argument can be made that would justify RUCO's decision to wait eight months before filing its application to intervene.

C. Intervention Will Cause Prejudicial Delay and Additional Cost.

As noted above, the most important factor to consider is whether intervention will cause prejudicial delay. Here, RUCO is not only arguing for intervention, but wants time to prepare testimony, present witnesses, and take any action available to parties to the case. Effectively, RUCO seeks to restart the case and postpone the hearing that is set to begin very soon.

Granting intervention at this stage of the case would be greatly prejudicial to Utility Source. This rate case has already been ongoing for more than eight months. The Company has lost substantial amounts of money since 2010. Further delay will exasperate the situation. Moreover, RUCO's intervention will undoubtedly cause the cost of this rate case to double, which will be a direct additional cost to the Company. The Company will seek to have these additional rate case expenses recovered in rates. Thus, RUCO's late intervention will end with customers paying the additional cost.

III. CONCLUSION AND ACTION REQUESTED.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny RUCO's application to intervene and leave the procedural schedule as it is currently set.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of July, 2014. Original and 13 copies of the foregoing filed this 9th day of July 2014, with: **Docket Control** Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 Daniel W. Pozefsky **Chief Counsel** Residential Utility Consumer Office 1110 West Washington, Suite 220 Phoenix, Arizona 85007

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